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Abstract 
Social work is a contested tradition, torn between the demands of social 
governance and autonomy. Today, this struggle is reflected in the division 
between the dominant, neoliberal agenda of service provision and the 
resistance offered by various critical perspectives employed by disparate 
groups of practitioners serving diverse communities. Critical social work 
challenges oppressive conditions and discourses, in addition to addressing 
their consequences in individuals’ lives. However, very few recent critical 
theorists informing critical social work have advocated revolution. A 
challenging exception can be found in the work of Cornelius Castoriadis 
(1922–97), whose explication of ontological underdetermination and 
creation evades the pitfalls of both structural determinism and post-
structural relativism, enabling an understanding of society as the contested 
creation of collective imaginaries in action and a politics of radical 
transformation. On this basis, we argue that Castoriadis’s radical-
democratic revisioning of revolutionary praxis can help in reimagining 
critical social work’s emancipatory potential. 
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Introduction 
Social work has always been a contested tradition – torn between the 
competing demands of social governance and autonomy. Today, this 
struggle is reflected in the division between the dominant, neoliberal 
disciplining of service provision and the resistance offered by various 
critical perspectives employed by disparate groups of practitioners 
serving diverse communities. The latter ‘critical social work’ tradition 
seeks to transform oppressive conditions and discourses, in addition to 
addressing their consequences in individuals’ lives. However, very few 
recent critical theorists (whether Marxian, feminist or post-structural) 
drawn upon by critical social work have articulated a revolutionary 
critique for the transformation of neoliberal capitalism and associated 
forms of oppression. A challenging exception can be found in the work of 
the post-Marxist philosopher Cornelius Castoriadis (1922–97), whose 
theory of society as the contested creation of collective imaginaries in 
action remains largely untapped by social workers concerned with the 
theory and practice of radical social change. 
 
While the engagement with Castoriadis’s ideas in social work is 
negligible, exceptions exist in Shuttleworth’s (1992; 2013) work on aged 
care and disabilities, rethinking autonomy in relation to 
heteronormativity, ableism, medicalisation and ageism. There is also 
insightful reference to Castoriadis by Madhu (2005) around the notion of 
 
‘praxis’ but not Castoriadis’s central thematic of revolutionary praxis. 
This article seeks to augment the development of critical social work by 
explicating aspects of Castoriadis’s work that may yield fresh 
perspectives on abiding theoretical and political tensions in emancipatory 
practice, most notably, in attempts to combine the concerns of post-
structuralism with critical theory for radical change (Pease et al, 2016). 
Unlike the mainstream social theorists drawn upon by many social 
workers (for example, Giddens, Beck, Bourdieu or Habermas), 
Castoriadis’s project refuses the confines of parliamentarism within a 
capitalist state and economy. In this, it shares major affinities with 
Marxian thinkers like Negri, Badiou and Ranciere, whose ideas are being 
utilised in the renewal of social work’s ‘New Left’ (Gray and Webb, 
2009; 2013; Garrett, 2015; 2018). Indeed, we argue that Castoriadis’s 
work provides a coherent and robust revisioning of revolutionary praxis 
that can help clarify and extend the revisioning of critical social work’s 
emancipatory potential without recourse to deterministic structural 
theories or the pitfalls of post-structural relativism. 
 
Our discussion commences with a sketch of Castoriadis’s life and work. 
Castoriadis was no armchair theoretician, but rather, in the manner of 
Marx, Addams, Gramsci, Fanon and Freire, an activist-intellectual 
concerned with rethinking the ways in which the imagination, theory and 
practice might promote human freedom and justice (Castoriadis, 1987). In 
this view, theory is not a mirror of reality or master guide to action, but 
 
rather a moment of lucid critical reflection within the processes of social 
change that can help effect a difference. As Castoriadis (1987: 57) 
explains: ‘We are not in the world to look at it or submit to it; our fate is 
not servitude; there is a type of action that can be based on what is, in 
order to bring into existence what we want to be.’ 
  
Accordingly, the discussion proceeds by showing how Castoriadis’s 
writing addresses three major concerns of critical social work, namely: (1) 
the philosophical basis of knowledge, which is currently characterised by 
debates between various realist positions (for example, the privileging of 
‘evidence-based practice’) and constructionism; (2) the substantive 
analysis of society and the individual; and (3) the question of 
emancipatory praxis. Addressing these concerns, the exposition highlights 
Castoriadis’s concepts of ontological underdetermination and creation, 
which underpin his theory of society as the contested institution of a 
‘magma’ of imaginary significations and so provides grounds for the 
radically democratic revolutionary project of autonomy (Castoriadis, 
1987; 1990b).We should add that this is a project that challenges not only 
neoliberal capitalism, but also multiple, forms of oppression, including 
racism, patriarchy, ableism, fundamentalism, heteronormativity and 
environmental despoliation, on which Castoriadis either wrote directly or 
to which his work has been extended by others. However, due to limited 
space, we have focused primarily on his critique of capitalism in 
presenting his revolutionary project.  
 
 
A Revolutionary Life 
Castoriadis was born in 1922 in Constantinople (Istanbul) to a Greek 
family who migrated to Athens in the wake of the Greco-Turkish War and 
its subsequent ‘ethnic cleansing’. By age 13, he began reading Marx, 
which became a politicising activity under the Metaxas dictatorship 
(Memos, 2014). In 1937, Castoriadis joined the Athenian Communist 
Youth, and in 1941, he joined the Greek Communist Party (KKE), which 
waged an armed struggle against the Nazi occupation. He also attended 
the University of Athens, graduating in politics, economics and law 
(Curtis, 1992). As a student, despite political differences, Castoriadis saw 
value in Max Weber’s work on bureaucracy and his emphasis on 
collectively shared meanings in constructing social forms (Castoriadis, 
1990a). A relentless questioner of received ideas, Castoriadis saw that all 
philosophical systems produced contradictions – ‘aporias and impasses’ 
(Castoriadis, 1997b: 371) – that could not be resolved within the system. 
In politics, this same critical spirit led him to break with Soviet 
communism when, in 1942, he joined the Trotskyists, effectively placing 
him on the death lists of both fascists and Stalinists for the duration of the 
war (Peregalli, 2002). 
 
In 1945, Castoriadis won a scholarship to study at the Sorbonne in Paris 
(Castoriadis, 1997b), where he took work as an economist at the 
headquarters of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
 
Development (OECD). He also joined the Trotskyist Fourth 
Internationale, which was debating the nature of socialism. Against the 
majority, Castoriadis argued that existing Soviet regimes were not 
socialist, but (combining Marx and Weber) ‘bureaucratic capitalist’ states 
with a new ‘ruling class’, and that another revolution would be necessary 
before socialism was possible. In 1948, Castoriadis broke with 
Trotskyism and the idea of a vanguard party to form (with Claude Lefort) 
a new libertarian-socialist organisation, Socialisme ou Barbarie 
(Socialism or Barbarism; henceforth S. ou B.) with a journal of the same 
name (Castoriadis, 1997b). 
 
An economist in his ‘day job’ (and non-citizen vulnerable to deportation 
at 24 hours’ notice), Castoriadis lived a revolutionary’s double life for the 
next two decades, agitating under the noms de plume Pierre Chaulieu, 
Paul Cardan and Jean-Marc Coudray (Singer, 1979). S. ou B. had a 
number of organisers in several factories (notably, at Renault) and 
prominent intellectuals who developed original analyses of their own, like 
Guy Debord of the Situationists, the complexity thinker Edgar Morin and 
the postmodernist Jean-François Lyotard (Hastings-King, 1999).A decade 
before the emergence of the New Left, S. ou B. supported anti-colonial 
struggles in Africa, welcomed African-American militancy in the US, 
opposed the industrial drive to ‘conquer nature’ and organised women’s 
consciousness-raising meetings to establish ‘new relations between the 
sexes’ (James et al, 2005 [1958]). 
 
 
As S. ou B.’s chief theoretician (1949–66), Castoriadis initiated a series 
of unsparing critiques of orthodox Marxism, extending his thesis on 
bureaucratic capitalism. He argued that the central dynamic of capitalism 
had shifted from ownership to a basic power division in society (East and 
West) between ‘order-givers’ (executives) and ‘order-takers’ (exécutants) 
in both production and civic life (Castoriadis, 1987). This division 
resulted in both political and economic struggles. The thesis found 
validation in workers’ uprisings in the Soviet bloc (East Germany in 
1953; Hungary in 1956) and post-war ‘wildcat’ strikes in the US. 
Accordingly, Castoriadis rejected statist definitions of socialism from 
above (via nationalisation and centralised planning), advocating instead 
‘socialism from below’ via workers’ self-management (autogestion), 
which he would expand into the radically democratic project of human 
autonomy. The theory also emphasised multiple forms of social 
oppression and division (beyond Marxist class analysis), whose 
overcoming would require collective action. By the time S. ou B. broke 
up in 1966, Castoriadis declared having ‘arrived at the point where we 
have to choose between remaining Marxist and remaining revolutionaries, 
between faithfulness to a doctrine … and faithfulness to the project of a 
radical change of society’ (Castoriadis, 1987: 14). However, unlike many 
‘post-Marxist’ contemporaries, Castoriadis’s reclamation of the 
revolutionary project makes no concessions to capitalism (Ojeili, 2001). 
 
 
The ideas of self-management, autonomous collective action and new 
democratic forms transcending capitalism articulated in the pages of S. ou 
B. found unexpected vindication in the Parisian student-worker uprising 
of May 1968. Its most prominent leader, Daniel Cohn-Bendit (Cohn-
Bendit and Cohn-Bendit, 1968), attributed many of his ideas to 
‘plagiarising’ Castoriadis, who worked clandestinely throughout the 
revolt. Despite its failure, the uprising confirmed Castoriadis’s impression 
that ‘spontaneous’ mass actions and the creation of new, participatory 
forms remain possible, even if their success can never be guaranteed. For 
social work, such insights offer new opportunities to conceptualise the 
nature and politics of a profession formally committed to liberation and 
justice (IFSW, 2014) in far more radical terms than current mainstream 
practice would envisage. 
 
In 1970, Castoriadis obtained French citizenship, retired from the OECD 
and retrained in psychotherapy under Jacques Lacan, but broke with the 
latter’s structuralism, commencing practice in 1974 (Curtis, 1992). This 
shift saw Castoriadis linking his concerns for both personal and social 
autonomy more explicitly. He continued developing his political and 
philosophical ideas during the last three decades of his life as director of 
studies at the Écoles des Hautes Etudes. He also engaged with various 
movements for expanding the direct democracy of citizens in 
transforming neoliberal capitalist society, including the ‘European Green 
parties’ and the participatory budgeting movement initiated by the 
 
Brazilian Workers Party at Porto Alegre (Souza, 2000). In December 
1997, Castoriadis died after heart surgery in Paris at age 75 (Agora 
International, 2014). 
 
The critical legacy of Castoriadis is consolidated in his most famous text, 
The Imaginary Institution of Society (Castoriadis,1987), in the first 
section of which he explicitly reformulates the revolutionary project. In 
subsequent essays, there are many parallels with the writings of critical 
theorists, and he shares some concerns with postmodern/post-structural 
thinkers in the critique of foundationalism. However, Castoriadis (1992) 
repudiates postmodernism as ‘the French Ideology’ (recalling Marx’s 
break with The German ideology) due to its epistemic relativism 
(Breckman, 1998) and his explicitly emancipatory, praxis-oriented 
agenda. His work therefore holds significant implications for critical 
social work in which tensions between post-structuralism and critical 
theory persist. 
 
Critical Social Work 
Critical approaches to social work are broad, diverse and contested. 
While some critical social workers (influenced by Marxism or 
Marxian critical theory) place more emphasis on the ubiquity of 
societal structures like capitalism wreaking havoc on people’s lives 
(Moreau 1979; Mullaly 2007; Ferguson and Lavalette, 1999; Ferguson 
2008; Lavalette, 2011), others influenced by postmodernism point to 
 
the irreducibility of multiple truths experienced by diverse identities 
subject to varying forms of oppression and exclusion (Leonard, 1997; 
Parton and O’Byrne, 2000), and still others attempt to work through 
the tensions between these positions (Pease and Fook, 1999; Allan et 
al, 2009; Morley and Macfarlane, 2012; Pease et al, 2016; Morley et 
al, 2019).  
 
Key features of critical social work include: a critical analysis of the 
ways in which socio-political structures create inequality and are 
therefore implicated in producing personally experienced problems; a 
critical analysis of language and power, and the interplay between 
these; a resistance to harmful social forces that create social divisions 
and oppression; the questioning of taken-for-granted assumptions; the 
capacity for critical self-reflection; a valuing of a wide range of 
knowledges; the promotion of respectful relationships; the 
decolonisation of social work to embed indigenous ways of knowing 
and practising; and activism for a more just, participatory and 
sustainable world (Morley et al, 2019).This position is currently under 
assault from many quarters: material inequalities are increasing; 
xenophobic and authoritarian populism is undermining democratic 
governance; eco-crisis is threatening the future of humanity; and 
service provision for the victims of the crises is being reduced to 
austere managerial techniques. Critical social work, with few 
exceptions (Ferguson, 2008; Lavalette, 2011; Gray andWebb, 2013; 
 
Garrett, 2015), has faced this crisis context with a largely reformist 
and not a revolutionary agenda. Therefore, a consideration of 
Castoriadis’s work offers critical social workers timely philosophical 
and political insights into the meaning and possibilities of revolution 
today. 
 
Ontological Underdetermination and Creation: Leaving 
Space for Revolution 
Castoriadis’s critique of Western philosophy questions not only its 
theories of knowledge (epistemology), but also its prevailing 
understanding of being (ontology) since Plato. This has direct 
implications for social work as, until relatively recently, ontology has 
been neglected in favour of epistemology in social work academic 
literature (Aymer and Okitikpi, 2000; Borden, 2010; Bell, 2012). 
However, in reviewing social work research paradigms, as Arnd-
Caddigan and Pozzuto (2006: 424) point out, ‘Notions of 
epistemology … [always] rest within an ontology’ because ontological 
questions ask: ‘what is the nature of the world one wishes to know 
about?’. Consequently, major philosophical debates in social work 
between realism and social constructionism are as much ontological as 
they are epistemological. In realism, for example, being is conceived 
as independent of the researcher/practitioner, albeit knowable via 
analytical-empirical methods. In constructionism, by contrast, being is 
something constituted intersubjectively and contingently by language 
 
and culture. Beyond this sparse binary, Arnd-Caddigan and Pozzuto 
(2006: 435) say that all further statements about the nature of being 
are speculative, leaving the realist–constructionist binary entrenched. 
Castoriadis’s ontology, by contrast, decentres this binary and offers an 
alternative standpoint. 
 
According to Castoriadis (1987: 41), the dominant ontology of 
Western thought is ‘objectivist rationalism’, or what he later calls an 
‘ensemblist-identitarian’(Castoriadis, 1987: 177) logic, which treats 
the universe (natural and social) as an exhaustive set of discretely 
identifiable forms (material and ideal) that are related through 
deterministic chains of inevitable cause and effect. Therefore, the 
‘truth’ of any phenomenon is exhausted once the mechanism of its 
causality or functionality within a preceding sequence is identified. 
This ontology gives rise to the mistaken view that the world can be 
subject to ‘rational mastery’, whereby determinate knowledge can be 
used to prescribe practice with a high degree of certainty regarding the 
outcome regardless of the circumstances (Castoriadis, 2007: 86). 
Despite epistemological distinctions, this same deterministic ontology 
underpins all forms of scientism, positivism, rationalist- empiricism, 
realism and evidence-based practice. 
 
Over 20 years ago, Peile (1993) and Zimmerman (1989) drew on 
cosmology to expose the problematic dominance of determinism in 
 
social work theory and practice. Today, ontological determinism in 
social work is most evident in the movement for ‘evidence-based 
practice’, where, as Madhu (2005: 267) says:  
[The] underlying assumption is that there exist permanent and 
empirically observable regularities between the problems 
faced by the client and the specific intervention…. Once the 
relationship is found, all that is necessary is to develop a 
‘package’ of social work practice that could be administered 
with the systems of management meant for that…. In this 
approach, the social problem and its manifestations are 
treated as if the society is an object. 
In the light of Castoriadis’s theory, the problem with this sort of approach 
is not that its findings are invalid, but rather that it privileges the 
determinate elements of the universe as exhaustive, and therefore distorts 
them. However, unlike extreme relativist versions of postmodernism (for 
example, Lyotard, 1993), Castoriadis (1987) does not view the ‘real’ 
(empirically testable) and ‘rational’ (logically deducible) aspects of being 
as simply a function of language without any contribution from the non-
linguistic world. Determinate relations are demonstrable (for example, 
that water boils at 100 °C at sea level and capitalist income inequalities 
increase without redistributive regulation) and cannot be arbitrarily 
dissolved. However, he insists these relations are but fragments and can 
never provide a definitive account of their subject matter. Relations of 
cause and effect reveal just one determinate layer of being. However, 
 
there remains a vast indeterminate layer that cannot be apprehended in 
this way but must be considered in understanding the human world and 
our actions within it. Castoriadis (1984) cites Heisenberg’s ‘uncertainty 
principle’ in quantum physics and Godel’s ‘incompleteness theorem’ in 
mathematics as evidence for indeterminacy in the physical universe. This 
underdetermined quality becomes even more apparent when attempting to 
explain the social world in rational-empirical terms (that is, the social 
sciences), where we are only ‘able to find a theory of partial “objective 
dynamics”’ (Castoriadis, 1987: 43–4), with no prospect of integrating 
these pieces into a system. In Castoriadis’s view, those aspects of the 
social world subject to causal explanation are exceptional, representing 
just a few ‘islands of determinacy in an ocean of indeterminacy’ (Joas, 
1989: 1192).The determinate elements we encounter in empirical studies 
are constantly interpenetrated by the indeterminate elements, rendering 
any scientific account of social problems or their solution partial, 
incomplete and fragmentary. 
 
Castoriadis sees ontological indeterminacy not as a political liability, but 
rather as a hopeful ground for those committed to revolutionary change. If 
society (and the individual) were entirely determinate, then it would be 
impossible to even conceive of genuinely new acts of creation or new 
ways of being. Freedom (self-determination and self-conscious agency) 
would itself be illusory, being the function of some other set of 
determinate processes or structures. All social change would consist in the 
 
determinable and predictable rearrangement of elements within a pre-
given set (for example, historical laws, linguistic structures, genetic codes 
and so on) but not the creation (ex nihilo) of something new. However, 
Castoriadis insists that we are constantly creating new images, forms and 
meanings. For example, at some point in history, somebody, somewhere 
invented the wheel as something utterly new, as something that never 
existed before and could not have been deduced from any set of pre-
existing elements. The source of this underdetermined creativity in the 
social world for Castoriadis is the human imagination, both at the 
personal (radical imaginary) and collective (social imaginary) level 
(Castoriadis, 1987). 
 
The imaginary, in Castoriadis’s (1997a: 84) sense, is not merely the 
illusory, but rather the capacity of human beings (whether conscious or 
not) for ‘positing new forms’. Imagination enables us ‘to see in a thing 
that which is not or not yet’ (Castoriadis, 1987: 104). For Castoriadis 
(1987: 150), the social imaginary includes the constantly unfolding 
constellations of instituted social meanings ‘that value or devalue, 
structure and hierarchize, an intersecting ensemble of objects and 
corresponding lacks’, that justifies the world view and practices of a 
social grouping. This includes a range of tacit knowledge, evaluative 
standards, aesthetic criteria, habits of thought and notions of ‘what is’ and 
‘what ought to be’ with which people operate in and change society. The 
creations of the imagination, whether individual or social, are never solely 
 
determinate. History admits the possibility of people doing things 
otherwise than predicted, to ‘provide new responses to the “same” 
situations or create new situations’ (Castoriadis, 1987: 44, emphasis in 
original). Consequently, for Castoriadis (in Joas, 1989: 1191),‘there can 
be no [causal] “explanation” of a creation; there can only be a 
comprehension ex post facto of its meaning’. While we can attempt the 
elucidation of the social world and its problems (constantly explicating 
their determinate and indeterminate aspects), we never achieve the 
rational closure or control that evidence- based social work assumes, 
which Castoriadis would deem epistemologically and politically naive. 
 
In the absence of such ontological critique, the proponents of evidence-
based social work typically and uncritically situate their empirical 
findings within the dominant social imaginary, currently characterised by 
the marriage of rationalist objectivism with neoliberal managerialism 
(Webb, 2001: 78). This framing conceals its own constructed and 
imaginary character (including its ethical, ideological and political nature) 
by focusing solely on narrow, technical, performance-oriented criteria 
that foster the delusion of ‘rational’ mastery (Castoriadis, 1997a: 37). By 
contrast, the recognition of ontological underdetermination and the 
creative imaginary basis of human understanding could potentially relieve 
social workers from the impossible goal of omniscient expertise in 
managing social problems. Simultaneously, it encourages critical social 
workers’ creative freedom to entertain and question multiple sources of 
 
understanding and to re-situate research findings in the service of 
alternative, emancipatory imaginaries (Bryant, 2015; Strega and Brown, 
2015). Such understanding would always have a provisional, anticipatory 
and reflexive character without the pretentions of deterministic 
objectivism. However, emancipatory imaginaries are not ready-made or 
static; they have to be created and recreated in collaboration with others: 
practitioners, the people they work with, citizens and non-citizens. To 
assist this, Castoriadis (1987) provides theoretical tools that might help 
social work in exposing social injustices and oppression with a view to 
radical transformation. 
 
Theory of Society and the Individual 
Critical social work’s understanding of social change faces the same 
conceptual dilemmas confronting critical theory generally, including the 
relation of the social to the non-social, the relation of inherited social 
forms (structure) to agency, and the relation between the individual and 
society. Castoriadis’s ontology of underdetermined creativity reframes 
these concerns. 
 
As indicated earlier, Castoriadis (1987: 234, 250) characterises the 
‘social’ domain as the ongoing creation in action of collective imaginary 
significations. Social action ‘leans on’ but is not reducible to any 
physical, biological or psychological ‘substratum’. These things may 
condition, but they never determine, the social or (as Castoriadis prefers) 
 
the socio-historical domain, which has its own dynamism in the social 
imaginary.  
 
Consistent with his ontology, Castoriadis’s social theory centres on social 
action rather than social structures. In this, he opposes theories that 
replace the contested ebb and flow of meaningful social practices by 
privileging the classification and analysis of underlying forms (Metcalfe, 
1989). Prominent examples that tend towards this form of theorising are 
found in functionalism, structuralism, systems theory, most Marxisms and 
early ‘structural’ social work. Despite the latter two’s emancipatory aims, 
the objectified abstractions of such perspectives can engender a structural 
determinism that obscures the actions of human beings in making society. 
A similar critique of structural social work’s implicit determinism and 
how this can contribute to a sense of powerlessness and pessimism 
regarding the prospects for social change has been staged by a number of 
critical social work scholars (Healy, 2000; Leonard, 1997; Fook, 2016) 
influenced by postmodernism. 
 
Castoriadis argued for a radical reframing rather than the dissolution of 
structural concepts, stressing that all ‘structural forms’, ‘systems needs’ 
and ‘functions’ have to be understood as constituted through the 
significations (social meanings) provided by a social imaginary, and are 
therefore always open to historical contestation and alteration (Honneth, 
1986: 68; Joas, 1989: 1190). Structures and institutional forms do not 
 
determine history, but are its transient products. Rather than thinking in 
terms of structures, Castoriadis refers to the unstable semi-solid, semi-
fluid character of the social world as the ‘magma’ of social imaginary 
significations, in which social forms are constantly in the process of 
emergence and transformation. For Castoriadis, society is an always 
open-ended dialectic between the created network of symbolically 
mediated institutions and the creating of new ones: ‘the union and the 
tension of instituting society and of instituted society, of history made and 
of history in the making’ (Castoriadis, 1987: 108, emphasis in 
original).Therefore, social change occurs not as the outcome of universal 
laws, but as new ideas and practices erupt within the existing order, and 
hence ‘society as instituted is self-destructed by society as instituting’ 
(Castoriadis, 1987: 201, emphases added). 
 
Reinterpreting and interrogating social ‘structures’ through Castoriadis’s 
‘magmatic’ lens as the contested creations of collective imaginations in 
action challenges fatalistic constructions of society and individuals. A 
critical interrogation of the imaginaries that invest dominant institutions 
and social divisions with their sense of immutability is the first step to 
their delegitimation and the reclamation of creative power by the 
dominated. What is exposed in every social division or institution is the 
constant interplay between the symbolic practices reproducing the 
‘instituted’ order and those ‘instituting’ something new (Castoriadis, 
1987). 
 
 
By placing the creative imagination at the centre of his social theory, 
Castoriadis develops a conception of agency that refuses to 
oppositionalise society and the individual. Instead, he posits a more 
fundamental distinction between society (the socio-historical) and the un-
socialised psyche (Curtis, 1992: 50). Here, the psyche is understood as the 
unconscious source of the radical imagination (an elementary flux of 
images both real and unreal) that, from the moment of birth (perhaps 
before), is disciplined by the social imaginary through socialisation and 
cannot survive without it. Hence, the individual is always already a social 
institution, a fragment – ‘or, better a sort of hologram – of the social 
world’ (Castoriadis, 1997a: 2) and its contradictions. 
 
Regardless of whether one accepts Castoriadis’s psychoanalytic usage of 
psyche, positing an indeterminate source of personal creativity counters 
both deterministic (Althusser, 1971; Skinner, 1971) and linguistically 
relativist (Barthes, 1977) accounts of the subject. In Castoriadis’s view, 
the social fabrication of subjectivity conditions, but never completely 
determines, our individuality.There is a creative part of us that does not 
simply mirror external reality, but conjures new images and potentially 
enables us to distinguish and choose alternative social imaginaries 
(Castoriadis, 1987: 149, 300). In this way, Castoriadis preserves a basis 
for personal agency and autonomy within the socialised individual, which 
post-structural analyses reduce to a discursive effect (for example, 
 
Foucault, 1981 [1970]). However, the creative agency that Castoriadis 
defends is never simply a matter of rational control, but rather results 
from the interplay of conscious deliberation, discourses and 
unconsciously evoked imaginings within society and its individuals. 
 
Understanding society as an imaginary creation does not mean that 
everyone within it is aware of, or participates equally (democratically) in, 
this creative process. On the contrary, since the rise of ‘civilisation’ in 
ancient Mesopotamia, most societies have been characterised by 
heteronomy (that is, ‘rule of the other’), in which the imaginary of the 
dominant group is instituted as natural, inevitable or divinely sanctioned 
(Castoriadis, 1987: 155). Castoriadis (1997a: 16–17) defines heteronomy 
as ‘the state where laws, principles, norms, values and meanings are given 
once and for all and where the society or the individual, as the case may 
be, has no action upon them’. Heteronomous imaginaries justify 
disparities in power and wealth, while concealing the socially constructed 
nature of these divisions. Multiple heteronomous divisions (principally 
around significations such as the market, state, nation, class, gender, 
ability, race and so on) intersect all contemporary societies (Castoriadis, 
1987: 109). Contemporary capitalism exemplifies a heteronomous social 
imaginary, whose key significations (of ‘markets’ and ‘commodities’) are 
presented as inevitable forces beyond human making or democratic 
accountability. These significations order and propel the enormous 
mobilisation of human creativity for limitless growth and profit, as well 
 
as the impossible quest to rationally master all creativity through 
techniques and technologies that threaten the future of both meaningful 
human labour and the earth itself (Castoriadis, 2007). 
 
In contrast to heteronomous societies, there are exceptional cases where 
the majority of the members of a society become conscious of its self-
institution and struggle for a more egalitarian collective agency, such as 
in Ancient Athenian democracy, early Renaissance communes and 
modern social movements. However, all of these are only partial 
approximations of the democratic-egalitarian ideal, with exclusions that 
need to be overcome (for example, the exclusion of women and slaves in 
Athens). Autonomy (that is, self-rule or self-determination) is therefore an 
imaginable possibility for the individual and society but by no means 
inevitable. It is a choice and a struggle. The creative indeterminacy of the 
social imaginary is a precondition for but cannot guarantee the autonomy-
enhancing praxis of revolution. 
 
Revolutionary Praxis as the Project of Autonomy 
For Castoriadis, praxis involves human action whose ‘goal’ is realised in 
its own enactment. To clarify, Castoriadis cites the examples of 
educational, healing and revolutionary practices, where a substantive 
‘end’ is expressed in the ‘means’ or performance, which is deemed 
intrinsically valuable. Praxis also involves reflection, which may revise 
prior knowledge in its course and conduct (Joas, 1989). He contrasts 
 
praxis with technique, which is valorised in corporate and public 
management settings, where instrumental means are fixated upon to the 
detriment of worthy goals. In praxis, human reflection creates projects 
that are constantly interrogated, revised and extended in the light of 
experience. Castoriadis says that praxis is a conscious, lucid activity and 
not simply the application of existing knowledge: 
It is based on knowledge, but this knowledge is always fragmentary and 
provisional. It is fragmentary because there can be no exhaustive theory 
of humanity and of history; it is provisional because praxis itself 
constantly gives rise to new knowledge…. This is why the relations of 
praxis to theory … [are] more profound than those of any ‘strictly 
rational’ technique or practice; for the latter, theory is only a code of 
lifeless prescriptions which can never, in its manipulations, encounter 
meaning. (Castoriadis, 1987: 76) 
For Castoriadis, the reflection involved in genuine praxis can never be 
simply analytical-empirical, but is essentially creative and critical. Praxis 
questions ‘what’ is being done in this or that practice, programme or 
policy, and ‘for what’ purpose (Castoriadis, 1984: 235). It is not simply 
the ‘know-how’ of technique. In the case of revolutionary praxis, an 
entire society questions its own constructed nature in a radically 
democratic fashion, confronting its current problems and injustices with 
imaginative projections of possible futures. However, if technical 
knowledge is treated as exhaustive and privileged over the purposeful, 
participatory and deliberative nature of praxis, then power will accrue to 
 
‘experts’, and praxis rapidly degenerates into managerial techniques, 
which abound in heteronomous welfare regimes. Unfortunately, argues 
Castoriadis (1987), this degeneration of praxis into technique also 
characterised Marxism–Leninism, the dominant theory of socialist 
revolution in the 20th century, reducing history-making to a natural 
process whose ‘laws of motion’ it claimed to grasp and know in advance. 
This equation of theory with deterministic science led to a prescriptive 
bureaucratisation of politics to effect control (Castoriadis, 1987: 
70).Technique has its place in human affairs in limited functional 
domains (for example, mechanics, accounting, surgery and so on), but 
when this monopolises the social imaginary, it is the antithesis of 
revolutionary praxis. 
  
Revolution 
As noted, revolution is not a common theme in social work, even in its 
more critical- political expressions (Pritchard andTaylor,1979). In actual 
revolutionary situations, with some notable exceptions, the social work 
profession has often been identified with the existing regime rather than 
the oppressed (Nguyen, 2002; Yu, 2006).As Ferguson (2013: 
195) affirms: ‘There are very few parts of the world in which the 
activities of social workers can be seen as constituting a threat to the 
established … order.’ Nevertheless, Ferguson (2016: 90), among others, 
has also identified a ‘new social work radicalism’ in the militant 
participation of organised groups of social workers, starting with the 
 
Social Work Action Network (SWAN) in the UK, the New Approach 
Group in Hungary, the Progressive Welfare Network in Hong Kong and 
Orange Tide in Spain, assailing the deprivations of neoliberalism. 
However, establishing synergisms between social work and revolution 
necessitates a significant redefinition of the dominant understandings of 
each project, and Castoriadis’s reframing of revolution can be helpful 
here. 
 
For Castoriadis (1990b: 130), revolution is not defined by ‘barricades, 
violence, bloodshed, and so on’, or by seizing the means of production or 
state power. Rather, the ‘socialist revolution aims at transforming society 
through the autonomous action of people and at establishing a society 
organized to promote the autonomy of all its members’ (Castoriadis, 
1987: 95). It is ‘the explicit self-institution of society by collective, lucid, 
democratic activity’ (Castoriadis, 1990b: 128). However, ‘every time a 
strong social movement has wanted to transform society radically but 
peacefully, it has run up against the violence of the established power’ 
(Castoriadis 1990b: 131). So, such movements must be prepared for 
confrontation by maximising participation in a self-organised fashion, 
being capable of action but without violating the purpose for which they 
were instituted. Castoriadis initially identified the general character of 
modern revolutions with ‘socialism’, but after 1980, he employs the term 
‘autonomy’ (Castoriadis, 1991). However, the substance of this social 
vision remained the same: a radically egalitarian, political and economic 
 
democracy. In contrast to a heteronomous society based on capitalism and 
representative democracy, an autonomous society facilitates ‘people’s 
conscious direction of their own lives’ (Castoriadis, 1997b: 51). While 
Castoriadis focuses on the political nature of autonomy, he emphasises 
that it would be ‘meaningless’ without the economic democracy sought 
by generations of socialists: ‘One could not imagine a society where 
people would be slaves in production every day of the week and then 
enjoy Sundays of political freedom’ (Castoriadis, 1997b: 59). 
 
The Project of Autonomy and Social Work 
‘Autonomy’ and ‘self-determination’ are terms that have long been 
regarded as key aims of social work (Biestick, 1951; McDermott, 
1975) but these are largely understood in liberal terms as the 
(negative) freedom of the individual against the coercive impositions 
of others or the state. Castoriadis rejects the liberal (and neoliberal) 
version of an exclusively individual autonomy as lopsided and 
illusory. An individual is a social creation and cannot therefore be free 
in an unfree society like capitalism. Autonomy (stemming from the 
Greek auto [‘self ’] and nomos [‘law’]) does not mean atomisation; 
rather, it means self-governance, both for the individual and society 
(Castoriadis, 1987: 107). Social autonomy therefore means a society 
being able to self-consciously institute and revise its own laws with 
the maximum participation of its members in direct democracy 
(Castoriadis, 1997a). The project of autonomy begins whenever a 
 
subordinate group starts to question the dominant imaginary that 
constructs their subordination as inevitable in order to seek equal 
participation. Individual autonomy is not fully possible without this 
collective shift, but, likewise, it begins in critical self-reflection, in 
bringing one’s socially constructed self (and its constructions) into 
question. Another defining feature of autonomy for Castoriadis (1987: 
87) is that it must develop ‘the autonomy of the other or of others’. 
This is because only if each person facilitates the autonomy of the 
other in their society can each expect their own autonomy to be 
respected. Accordingly, social autonomy must engender a ‘self-
limiting’ regime against majoritarian populism and its tragic 
consequences. Castoriadis (1997a) anticipates that such self-limiting 
practices will (must) be supported by an inclusive democratic 
education or paideía. Beyond this, autonomy is an open-ended project 
and subject to creative extension (or reversal). 
 
Castoriadis (1991) counterposes this revolutionary project of 
autonomy, which has only ever been partially approximated in history, 
to the now-dominant imaginary of neoliberalism, where people 
surrender their agency to market despotism and ‘representative’ 
democracy (which he called ‘liberal oligarchy’). Moving from 
heteronomy to autonomy will require struggles for the direct 
participation of the public in political and economic life in ways 
currently discouraged or foreclosed by the instituted imaginary, 
 
including that of social work. However, the possibility of autonomy as 
a historical practice (expressed in many social movements) is 
recurrent in all struggles for inclusive and direct democracy against 
elite rule. Recent manifestations of direct democratic irruptions are 
visible in the Icelandic ‘pots and pans’ revolution, the factory 
repossession movement in Argentina, the Landless Workers 
Movement of Brazil, the Rojavan confederation of Syrian Kurdistan, 
the Zapatistas of Mexico and the continuing reactivation of libertarian 
socialist tendencies in Spain. 
 
While individuals cannot change society alone, one need not wait for 
radical movements to emerge before supporting the project of 
autonomy in public and professional life. Castoriadis (2007: 97) 
insisted that, historically, ‘the seeds of autonomy have already been 
created and are still alive’, even within ‘some aspects of … formal 
institutions’, and the project now ‘resides in efforts to preserve and 
develop those seeds’. Critical social work plays a role in fostering 
these ‘seeds’ when it promotes autonomy at every level from 
casework to social action and policy practice, refusing to delink these 
domains. We suggest that in casework, analogous to Castoriadis’s 
psychoanalytic practice, there remains the conversational task with 
individual service users of challenging neoliberal constructions of 
their alleged ‘dysfunction’ or failure, identifying contextual 
constraints, and encouraging the exercise of creative, reflexive and 
 
relational agency. At the level of social policy and action, the failure 
of neoliberalism to reduce inequality or poverty is palpable. 
Therefore, policies that provide a non-bureaucratic politico-economic 
floor enabling all people to participate equitably as democratic 
citizens are paramount for the project of autonomy. Campaigns for an 
adequate and universal basic income or basic assets, for example, 
might meet this criterion and are on the agenda in many countries, 
providing focal points for activism and debate in which social workers 
are participating (Kennelly, 2017;Ablett et al, 2019). If social workers 
are to expand their capacity for revolutionary praxis, then social work 
education must, of course, also prepare them not merely with skills for 
the existing order, but with a critical paideía of democratic 
experimentalism for facing the crises and breakthroughs to come 
(Ablett and Morley, 2020)   
 
Conclusion: Social Work as Revolutionary Praxis?  
This article has engaged with the critical political philosophy of 
Castoriadis with a view to rethinking the relationship between social 
work and revolution in a way that interrogates the dominant 
heteronomous constructions of both projects. This philosophy centres 
on an ontological standpoint of underdetermined creation, which 
evades the impasses of determinism and relativism, foreshadowing an 
emancipatory politics that could enhance the mission of critical social 
work. 
 
 
Castoriadis’s critical theory of society as the contested creation of 
collective imaginaries elucidates a revolutionary praxis without 
prescriptive, teleological guarantees or an expert vanguard 
undermining its purpose. Although exceptional, this revolutionary 
praxis of deliberate and democratic social self-creation, which 
mutually upholds the autonomy of the other, is repeatedly pursued and 
emergent in many instances throughout the world. Social workers, 
committed to socially transformative practices, also participate in such 
struggles, often in response to the concrete contradictions and 
suffering in the lives of the people they work with. However, many do 
so with a conception of social work that still tacitly accepts 
parliamentarism and a capitalist economy as the last word (Garrett, 
2015; 2018).The project of autonomy articulated by Castoriadis is one 
of the few that advocates an alternative politics of radical rupture with 
this heteronomous paradigm, providing an opportunity for social 
workers to further question and re-envisage the imaginary of their 
profession and of the society in which it operates. In attesting to the 
revolutionary power of the imagination, Castoriadis’s work represents 
a vigorous reproach to all declarations that history ends in the 
nihilistic imaginary of limitless production, exploitation and 
consumption that animates global capitalism. 
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